Thai VI

1.บริษัทนี้มีสินค้า หรือบริการที่มีศักยภาพทางการตลาด ที่สามารถทำยอดขายให้เพิ่มขึ้นอย่างชัดเจนในอีกหลายๆปีข้างหน้าได้หรือไม่?
2.ผู้ บริหารของบริษัทมีแนวทางในการพัฒนาสินค้าใหม่ หรือขบวนการใหม่ๆที่ช่วยเพิ่มศักยภาพในการขายสินค้า ในขณะที่สิ้นค้าชนิดเดิมก็ยังคงมีศักยภาพในการเติบโตที่สูง
3.การวิจัยและพัฒนาของบริษัทมีประสิทธิภาพมากแค่ไหนเมื่อเทียบกับขนาดของบริษัท?
4.บริษัทนี้มีหน่วยงานขายที่อยู่สูงกว่าเกณฑ์มาตรฐานหรือไม่?
5.บริษัทนี้มีกำไรขั้นต้นสูงหรือไม่ ?
6.บริษัทมีกลยุทธ์อะไรในการรักษาหรือเพิ่มกำไรขั้นต้นให้สูงขึ้น?
7.บริษัทมีหน่วยงานแรงงานสัมพันธ์ที่ดีหรือไม่?
8.ผู้บริหารภายในบริษัทมีความสัมพันธ์ที่ดีต่อกันหรือไม่
9.การจัดการของบริษัทมีความซับซ้อนหรือไม่
10.บริษัทมีการวิเคราะห์และควบคุมต้นทุน และบัญชีดีแค่ไหน
11.บริษัทมีแนวทางในการสร้างความแตกต่างของสินค้าและบริการเมื่อเทียบกับคู่แข่งขันอย่างไร
12.บริษัทมีทัศนะทั้งในระยะสั้นและระยะยาวต่อการทำกำไรของบริษัทอย่างไร?
13.ใน อนาคตที่ไม่สามารถคาดเดาได้นั้น หากบริษัทต้องการเงินทุนด้วนการระดมทุนเพิ่มเพิ่มเพื่อสร้างการเติบโตให้สูง ขึ้น การที่มีหุ้นเพิ่มสูงขึ้นจะกระทบผลประโยชน์ผู้ถือหุ้นมากน้อยอย่างไร?
14.ให้สังเกตว่า เมื่อยามที่กิจการไปได้ดีผู้บริหารของบริษัทยินดีที่จะพูดคุยอย่างตรงไปตรง มากับนักลงทุน แต่ในยามที่มีเหตูการเลวร้ายผู้บริหารจะหายตัวไปหรือไม่?
15.บริษัทมีผู้บริหารที่ซื่อสัตย์หรือไม่

4. No. 4: How Richly Is the Company's Stock Valued?
It's wonderful to find a company whose earnings are growing exponentially. But the other side of the equation is the value the market pays for that growth and the prospect of future growth.

แปลว่า
IPO 15 ราคา 100% เปล่า
ราคาเป็น ของกำไร อีก 3 ปีหน้า หรือเปล่า

Benjamin Graham's definition of an investment
from "The Intelligent Investor" -
"An investment operation
is one which,
upon thorough analysis,
promises
safety of principal
and an adequate return.

Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.

"Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future.
At Berkshire Hathaway, we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the
transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- after taxes have been paid on nominal gains -- in the future.
More succinctly,
investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

From our definition there flows an important corollary:
The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the reasoned probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk."

The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three questions.

{1}How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush?
{2} When will they emerge and
{3} how many will there be?

What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush ¾ and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don’t literally think birds. Think dollars.

Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota ¾ nor will the Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.

imerlot เขียน:แปลไทยนิดๆ
จะได้ว่า
ปู่แกรแฮม
การลงทุน
เข้าเงือ่นไข3ข้อ
1. ต้องผ่านการวิเคราะห์อย่างถี่ถ้วน
2. ต้องเงินต้นปลอดภัย
3. และผลตอบแทนคุ้มค่าเพียงพอ
....
ส่วน
ลุงบัฟ ปี2000
ต่อยอดว่า
investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.
1. ยอมเสียการใช้จ่ายในวันนี้
2. เพื่อให้ได้ความสามารถในการใช้จ่ายที่สูงกว่ามากในวันข้างหน้า
โดย
นกหนึ่งตัวในมือนั้นมีค่ามากกว่านก 2 ตัวในพุ่มไม้
ก่อนที่เราจะปล่อยนกหนึ่งตัวออกจากมือไปเพื่อหวังนกสองตัวในพุ่มไม้
เราต้องแน่ใจว่า
ก) {1}How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush?
มีความแน่ใจขนาดไหนว่ามีนกอยู่ในต้นไม้จริง
ข){2} When will they emerge and
เมื่อไหร่นกจะโผล่หัวออกมาให้เห็น
ค){3} how many will there be?
และมันมีกี่ตัวกันแน่
.....

Mohnish Pabrai’s long-only equity fund has returned a cumulative 517% net to investors vs. 43% for the S&P 500 Index since inception in 2000. That’s outperformance of 474 percentage points or 1103 percent.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/phildemuth/ ... ince-2000/

imerlot เขียน:ลองดู checklist ของ
mohnish pabrai
คนที่ ยอมจ่าย 6แสนเหรียญเพื่อกินมื้อเที่ยงการกุศลกับลุงบัฟ
Pabrai’s
claim to fame happened in June 2007 when he bid $650,100 for a charity lunch with Warren Buffett.
ผลงานเขา
forbe ไว้ว่า

Mohnish Pabrai’s long-only equity fund has returned a cumulative 517% net to investors vs. 43% for the S&P 500 Index since inception in 2000. That’s outperformance of 474 percentage points or 1103 percent.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/phildemuth/ ... ince-2000/

....

http://www.slideshare.net pabrai.png

source:
http://www.slideshare.net/MShareS/how-m ... checklists

...
บอกได้เลยว่า มีประโยชน์มากๆ เรื่อง upside earnings engine-moat
..

Warren Buffett’s (Modern Day) Margin Of Safety
February 14, 2012

Dear Mr. Gannon,

…in your analysis of Mr. Buffett, I often read you say that his margin of safety isn't always achieved by simply coming up with an intrinsic value for a business and then slapping a discount on it. However, why does he often make reference to what he thinks a business is worth and then compare it to what he bought the stock for (e.g. Washington Post was selling for $100m when he thought it was worth $400-500m, Wells Fargo was worth more than double what Berkshire paid, PetroChina was selling for $30bn when he thought it was worth north of $100bn etc). This seems quite different from the day one return of 15% requirement mentioned in the Mid Continent Tab Card Company example. Do you think this difference arises from the fact that he has a different valuation procedure when investing in stocks to whole businesses (although he says they are essentially the same thing)?

Kind Regards,

Pratham

No. I think Warren Buffett usually thinks in terms of the return he can get on a stock. He has mentioned valuations to students before. He doesn't do it very often. Honestly, he doesn't give precise figures of either returns on investment or valuations very often. But he has many times – even with Bank of America (BAC) recently – talked about the kind of returns he can get in that stock versus everything else. I don't think he comes up with an intrinsic value estimate for something like Bank of America. I think he looks at the earning power. Also, if you look at some of the intrinsic value estimates Buffett has given in the past for companies, they seem to be closely connected to demonstrated earning power.

Someone mentioned a bank Warren Buffett bought for his partnership. If you read what he wrote about that bank it's clear his intrinsic value estimate is merely a rounded off percentage return. So, if he thought stocks should return 8% a year, he might say that a company earning – on average – about $5 a share is worth $60. In this case, it's reasonable to think he is just multiplying a company's earnings by the inverse of what a decent return would be in securities generally. Since 1 divided by 8% is 12.5. And 8% is a reasonable return. He may round that off to 12 and slap a 12 P/E on a stock for that reason.

I mention this because when Buffett uses the word "conservatively" in a valuation – it tends to be a valuation similar to what I just described. It almost seems as if his idea of conservative is a sort of "no-growth" valuation. This makes sense in context – especially at Berkshire – because Buffett's habit has been pretty much to never buy companies he expects to stagnate or shrink.

He only buys growing companies.

In that case, as long as growth is expected and the return on capital is solid, he just needs the price to average earnings ratio to be reasonable. The one thing I would say there is no evidence for Buffett doing is a discounted cash flow analysis. Whatever valuations he has done – I don’t think the idea of projecting earnings into the future and then discounting them back is part of it.

He has – however – mentioned future valuations in static terms. In other words, he's said that if we had to hold the stock it might increase in value from say $60 a share to $140 a share ten years from now. What there is not much support for is a Ben Graham type analysis. He doesn't seem to talk about a stock apart from its normal earning power.

And since Buffett now has held several stocks for a very, very long time the idea of worrying too much about the valuation at the time you buy seems silly. He has to know the price is reasonable and the return on his investment will be good. But no one time discount to current intrinsic value is going to still be supplying great returns in 15 or 30 years. And he has now owned some stocks for that long.

Let's use 20 years – about the length of time he’s owned Coca-Cola (KO) and Wells Fargo (WFC) – as an example.

If Warren Buffett buys a stock at 33 cents on the dollar in terms of price to intrinsic value and then the stock grows intrinsic value by 6% a year for the next 20 years at which point the stock trades at its new intrinsic value his compound return would be 12% a year. Buying a big cap stock at 1/3 of intrinsic value is a pretty extreme discount. And yet a return of 12% a year – while still quite good – is possible in some stocks that are already trading at a fair P/E as long as they are growing.

My point is just that over a period of 20 years or so, you're not going to get more than maybe 6% a year in your return coming from closing the initial valuation gap. In this sense, I mean a multiple. So, if you pay 5 times earnings for something that is worth 15 times earnings or 1 times book value for something that is worth 3 times book value – that kind of valuation gap will only provide about 6% a year over 20 years if the company itself is compounding book value, EPS, etc. at a leisurely 6% pace. You see how paying a bit more for something that could compound at 10% a year starts to make sense when you have a holding period of 20 years. Thinking you will have 10% growth and then ending up with 3% growth would be a big deal. But this kind of mistake isn't that hard to make outside of companies with good moats, indispensable products, etc.

So my point is just that having a clear idea of the intrinsic valuation as of this moment is more important when buying stocks you intend to hold for 1, 3, 5, or maybe 10 years. Many investors – Ben Graham included – had turnover in their portfolios that meant the average stock might be held for anywhere from 2 to 5 years. In those situations, the discount to intrinsic value – in other words the low price to NCAV, book value, earnings, sales, etc. – can have a very large influence on your annual return over the full holding period. But as your holding period gets longer – and Buffett's holding periods have gotten very, very long – you need to spend a lot of time thinking about the return on your investment and the return on what the company retains and so on

First, you want to buy businesses that you understand well. If you are successful in doing so, then it is a somewhat predictable business, and, as a result, you do not only have a high degree of certainty but you are also able to forecast what the business might be worth a few years from now based on cash flow or hard assets or liquidation values. It always depends on the specific situation. At that stage you have a basis to place a bet if there is a wide gap between the intrinsic value and market value.

Q: Generally, what kind of businesses are not predictable or do not make it through your first cut?

A : Industries of rapid change are an almost automatic pass. Technology companies and biotech companies would be an automatic pass. A company like Google would be a very quick pass. Generally, I would not be spending time on anything that is in an industry subject to quick change, or a business that is subject to quick change.

For example, we used to have an investment a few years ago in Stewart Enterprises, a company in the funeral services business. The way humans deal with the deceased is extremely slow to change. In fact, that process has changed little over several centuries and it is unlikely to change much in the next few centuries. That is a business that one can firmly predict. You would not know who is going to pass away, but you can process data and calculate how many will.

Therefore, this is a business that you can forecast because it is based on death rates, which set the parameters in the revenue model. Moreover, you can also forecast what the earnings are because the margins are stable. That is something that, on a number of fronts, makes Stewart Enterprises the actual opposite of some biotech company. Actually, in 2002, 2001, when I made the investment, Stewart was a business that was trading at less than three times cash flow and, even if you assumed that the business was not going to grow, a business that has that much stability is worth a lot more than three times cash flow. It was a no-brainer investment to buy a stake in Stewart. We doubled our money in a few months’ time and moved on.