1. Investment vs Speculation
2. Margin of Safety
3. Mr. Market (Use market fluctuations to your advantage)
4. -Buying the Relatively Unpopular Large Company "salad oil" scandal
1. Philip Fisher's famous
"Fifteen Points to Look for in a Common Stock"
2. Focus Investing คือ
"Put Big bet on High Probabilities Events"
3. เคล็ดวิชาตีลูก .400 waiting for perfect pitch "Ted Williams" and "Warren Buffett"
(แปลแบบ..บ้านก็คือ ไม่ตีลูกที่เข้ามา ถ้่าโอกาส การตี ถูกลูกยัง ไม่ดี พอ.
และ ตี ต่อเมื่อ โอกาสเปิด ให้ ตีถูกลูกเต็มๆ มาถึง หรือ ไม่ซื้อหุ้น ถ้า โอกาส กำไร มีน้อย ไม่น่า สนใจ แต่จะซื้อต่อเมื่อโอกาสกำไร มีสูงมากๆ และซื้อในจำนวน มาก โดยตั้งตารออย่างอดทน.)
4. ผลตอบแทนระยะยาว VI -บทเรียน 42ปี จาก Warren Buffett Berkshire Hathaway Return
F =I'd be fully invested.
5.
9. "If I was running $1 million today, or $10 million for that matter, I'd be fully invested. Anyone who says that size does not hurt investment performance is selling. The highest rates of return I've ever achieved were in the 1950s. I killed the Dow. You ought to see the numbers. But I was investing peanuts then. It's a huge structural advantage not to have a lot of money. I think I could make you 50% a year on $1 million. No, I know I could. I guarantee that."
17. "The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands."
continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash
Now, speculation ¾ in which the focus is not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it ¾ is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take anything home?
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities ¾ that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future ¾ will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.
Last year, we commented on the exuberance ¾ and, yes, it was irrational ¾ that prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown to be several multiples of probable returns. One piece of evidence came from a Paine Webber-Gallup survey of investors conducted in December 1999, in which the participants were asked their opinion about the annual returns investors could expect to realize over the decade ahead. Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an irrational expectation: For American business as a whole, there couldn’t possibly be enough birds in the 2009 bush to deliver such a return.
Far more irrational still were the huge valuations that market participants were then putting on businesses almost certain to end up being of modest or no value. Yet investors, mesmerized by soaring stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into these enterprises. It was as if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses that underlay them.
This surreal scene was accompanied by much loose talk about "value creation." We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of true value created in the past decade by new or young businesses, and that there is much more to come. But value is destroyed, not created, by any business that loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its interim valuation may get.
What actually occurs in these cases is wealth transfer, often on a massive scale. By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes, promoters have in recent years moved billions of dollars from the pockets of the public to their own purses (and to those of their friends and associates). The fact is that a bubble market has allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to making money off investors rather than for them. Too often, an IPO, not profits, was the primary goal of a company’s promoters. At bottom, the "business model" for these companies has been the old-fashioned chain letter, for which many fee-hungry investment bankers acted as eager postmen.
But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street ¾ a community in which quality control is not prized ¾ will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest.
At Berkshire, we make no attempt to pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises. We’re not smart enough to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Aesop’s 2,600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to "A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook."). Obviously, we can never precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a business or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our estimates conservative and to focus on industries where business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we make many mistakes: I’m the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the future economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier department stores.
Lately, the most promising "bushes" have been negotiated transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us. You should clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions will at best provide us only reasonable returns. Really juicy results from negotiated deals can be anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained and the whole business world is pessimistic. We are 180 degrees from that point.
The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three questions. 1. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush? 2.When will they emerge and how many will there be? 3. What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)?
If you can answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush ¾ and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don’t literally think birds. Think dollars.
นกในมือ-เงินในมือ มีค่าเท่ากับ นกสองตัวในป่า
แปลว่า ราคาสูงสุดที่คุณจะซื้อ นั้น คือ 3/4 ของ "Maximum value of the BUSH"
หรือ 75% มี อย่างน้อย 25% MOS
ส่วน "Maximum value of the BUSH" นกในป่าหาโดย 3 ข้อ
แต่นักเก็งกำไร speculator นั้น
Now, speculation ¾ in which the focus is not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it ¾ is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take anything home?
One of the peculiar things about stock markets is the fact that investors like to buy when the markets are doing well and the stock prices are on their way up. This is not the best way to invest given the fact that in everyday life we like to buy more of something only when the prices are low.
Buffett explains this point in his letter to the shareholders for the year 1997. "A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices?"
"These questions," he goes on, "of course, answer themselves. But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period?
***
Many investors get this one wrong.
Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall.
***
In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the 'hamburgers' they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
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