คำถามเรื่องผลตอบแทนต่อปีของปู่บัฟฯ ครับ

[ดำ]

เคยอ่านเจอในหนังสือ (ถ้าจำไม่ผิดจะเป็นเรื่อง 85 ไอเดียฯ ของคุณสุมาอี้) เกี่ยวกับผลตอบแทนย้อนหลังในแต่ละปีของบัฟเฟตต์

จากสถิติย้อนหลังไปน่าจะ 40 กว่าปี เคยมีขาดทุนแค่ปีเดียวเอง และได้ผลตอบแทนเฉลี่ยต่อปีประมาณ 20 กว่า%

ที่ติดใจคือ ทั้งๆที่เชื่อกันว่าสไตล์การลงทุนของบัฟเฟตต์เป็นการลงทุนระยะยาวเป็นหลัก อาจมีเงินสดในมือบ้างแต่ไม่น่าจะเป็นสัดส่วนที่มากนัก แล้วทำไมถึงแทบไม่เคยมีปีไหนที่ขาดทุนเลย ทั้งๆที่ตลอดช่วง 40 กว่าปีที่ผ่านมาเศรษฐกิจ US เจอวิกฤตกันสารพัดแบบตั้งหลายๆรอบ

ปู่แกทำได้อย่างไรครับ?

[Jeng]

แกก็ทำเงินตลอด

If Ambac and MBIA were to accept his offer, for example, with combined reserves of $6bn, Berkshire would net around $3bn.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/news ... l-out.html

อันนี้ตอนสมัย subprime

[Jeng]

http://www.arabianmoney.net/us-stocks/2 ... ket-crash/

Posted on 27 February 2011 with 1 comment from readers The world’s most successful investor is ready for another ‘major’ acquisition and has $38 billion in cash ready to pick up bargains as the stock market falls from its recent high.

Warren Buffett’s famous annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders said: ‘Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy… We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions’.

Railway king

A year ago Buffett bought Burlington Northern Santa Fe, America’s second-biggest railroad company, for $26.5 billion, something he described as a bet on the recovery of America but others saw as an inflation play.

Buffett has sold out of Goldman Sachs who he rescued in the global financial crisis two years ago, one source of that amazing cash pile. And anybody who can make billions out of Goldman in a crisis is clearly not to be underestimated.

So what and who is he waiting for? Surely the Sage of Omaha senses another violent downswing of the market pendulum is almost upon us with oil touching $120. Oil price spikes have been a certain predictor of stock market sell-offs and recessions since the 70s.

But even at 80 Warren Buffett is not an old man in a hurry. He has always been a patient man, sitting with his elephant rifle for just the right moment to pull the trigger. The last time it took a matter of a few months for an oil spike to crash financial markets. It may not be different this time.

What to buy?

Will he buy another railway set? This is not just a big boy’s toy. Railways have monopolies and can raise prices. At the same time they compete very effectively with road as an alternative when oil energy costs are rising.

Buffett is also notoriously low-tech in his investments. He prefers a sure cash-flow to the fad of the moment so that he can calculate steady returns that generally turn out to be stellar, and that is where the financial genius comes is apparent.

America will always have another Warren Buffett in financial terms. Hedge fund manager John Paulson is already getting higher returns. But Buffett is an investment icon and philosophy that nobody else can match.

บัพเฟต ก็ซื้อกิจการที่ดี ในราคาที่เหมาะสม และก็ขายทำกำไร เมื่อมีโอกาส

ซึ่งก็เป็นเรื่องปกติ ของนักลงทุน

[i-salmon]

พี่โจ๊คเพิ่งแนะนำให้อ่านบทความนี้ใน the economist ครับ ลองอ่านดู


The secrets of Buffett’s success
Beating the market with beta

Sep 29th 2012 |

IF INVESTORS had access to a time machine and could take themselves back to 1976, which stock should they buy? For Americans, the answer is clear: the best risk-adjusted return came not from a technology stock, but from Berkshire Hathaway, the conglomerate run by Warren Buffett. Berkshire also has a better record than all the mutual funds that have survived over that long period.

Some academics have discounted Mr Buffett as a statistical outlier. Others have simply stood in awe of his stock-picking skills, which they view as unrepeatable. But a new paper* from researchers at New York University and AQR Capital Management, an investment manager, seems to have identified the main factors that have driven the extraordinary record of the sage of Omaha.

Understanding the success of Mr Buffett requires a brief detour into investment theory. Academics view stocks in terms of their sensitivity to market movements, or “beta”. Stocks that move more violently than the market (rising 10%, for instance, when the index increases by 5%) are described as having “high beta”, whereas stocks that move less violently are considered “low beta”. The model suggests that investors demand a higher return for owning more volatile—and thus higher-risk—stocks.

The problem with the model is that, over the long run, reality has turned out to be different. Low-beta stocks have performed better, on a risk-adjusted basis, than their high-beta counterparts. As a related paper† illustrates, it should in theory be possible to exploit this anomaly by buying low-beta stocks and enhancing their return by borrowing money (leveraging the portfolio, in the jargon).

But this anomaly may exist only because most investors cannot, or will not, use such a strategy. Pension schemes and mutual funds are constrained from borrowing money. So they take the alternative approach to juicing up their portfolios: buying high-beta stocks. As a result, the average mutual-fund portfolio is more volatile than the market. And the effect of ignoring low-beta stocks is that they become underpriced.

Mr Buffett has been able to exploit this anomaly. He is well-known for buying shares in high-quality companies when they are temporarily down on their luck (Coca-Cola in the 1980s after the New Coke debacle and General Electric during the financial crisis in 2008). “It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price,” he once said. He has also steered largely clear of more volatile sectors, such as technology, where he cannot be sure that a company has a sustainable advantage.

Without leverage, however, Mr Buffett’s returns would have been unspectacular. The researchers estimate that Berkshire, on average, leveraged its capital by 60%, significantly boosting the company’s return. Better still, the firm has been able to borrow at a low cost; its debt was AAA-rated from 1989 to 2009.

Yet the underappreciated element of Berkshire’s leverage are its insurance and reinsurance operations, which provide more than a third of its funding. An insurance company takes in premiums upfront and pays out claims later on; it is, in effect, borrowing from its policyholders. This would be an expensive strategy if the company undercharged for the risks it was taking. But thanks to the profitability of its insurance operations, Berkshire’s borrowing costs from this source have averaged 2.2%, more than three percentage points below the average short-term financing cost of the American government over the same period.

A further advantage has been the stability of Berkshire’s funding. As many property developers have discovered in the past, relying on borrowed money to enhance returns can be fatal when lenders lose confidence. But the long-term nature of the insurance funding has protected Mr Buffett during periods (such as the late 1990s) when Berkshire shares have underperformed the market.

These two factors—the low-beta nature of the portfolio and leverage—pretty much explain all of Mr Buffett’s superior returns, the authors find. Of course, that is quite a different thing from saying that such a long-term performance could be easily replicated. As the authors admit, Mr Buffett recognised these principles, and started applying them, half a century before they wrote their paper.
* “Buffett’s Alpha”, by Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller and Lasse Pedersen, August 2012
† “Betting Against Beta”, by Andrea Frazzini and Lasse Pedersen, October 2011

http://www.economist.com/node/21563735